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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in
Matter of G-G-S- that a noncitizen’s mental health status at
the time of an offense is irrelevant to determining whether the
offense is a “particularly serious crime” for immigration
purposes.1 Since a “particularly serious crime” is a bar to
asylum and withholding of removal, it can result in a
noncitizen’s deportation to a country where he or she faces a
serious risk of persecution. In deciding that immigration
judges “are constrained by how mental health issues were
addressed as part of the criminal proceedings,” the BIA failed
to recognize the many reasons why criminal proceedings
often do not actually take into account the role of mental
illness.2 This Essay explicitly examines those reasons in
arguing that evidence of mental illness should be permitted

† Fatma Marouf (B.A. Yale, J.D. Harvard), Associate Professor of Law and
Co-Director of the Immigration Clinic, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William
S. Boyd School of Law.
1 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 339 (BIA 2014).
2 Id.
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as part of the “particularly serious crime” determination.
I
THE BIA’S RECENT DECISION IN MATTER OF G-G-SUnder the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an
individual becomes ineligible for asylum and withholding of
removal if the immigration judge determines that “the alien,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, is a danger to the community of the United
States.”3 Neither the INA nor its regulations define the term
“particularly serious crime.”4 Accordingly, its meaning has
been developed through case law. The BIA generally applies a
multifactor test to determine whether a conviction constitutes
a “particularly serious crime.”5 These factors include “the
nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying
facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and
most importantly whether the type and circumstances of the
crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community.”6
The BIA does not require a separate
determination of dangerousness after the noncitizen is found
to have committed a particularly serious crime.7 Rather, the
“essential key” to the particularly serious crime determination
is “whether the nature of the crime is one which indicates
that the alien poses a danger to the community.”8
Before Matter of G-G-S-, an immigration judge could have
considered an individual’s mental health status at the time of
an offense as part of the circumstances and underlying facts
of the conviction, as well as in considering dangerousness.
Taking the noncitizen’s mental health into consideration
could have potentially helped mitigate the seriousness of an
offense by explaining the context in which it occurred. For
example, if a noncitizen with schizophrenia was convicted for
making threats while suffering from paranoid delusions, an
immigration judge could have previously decided that the
circumstances were an extenuating factor.
Even if this
individual pleaded guilty and never raised the issue of mental
3 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
4 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2015).
5 Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 246–47 (BIA 1982).
6 Id. at 247.
7 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007).
8 Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (BIA 1986); see also
Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing
dangerousness as “the pivotal standard by which particularly serious crimes
are judged”).
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health during the criminal proceedings, the immigration
judge still could have considered evidence regarding mental
health at the time of the offense, as the BIA had specifically
held that “all reliable information may be considered in
making a particularly serious crime determination,
including . . . information outside the confines of a record of
conviction.”9
While purporting to rely on such precedents, Matter of GG-S- effectively carved out an exception from the general rule
that all reliable information may be considered in the
“particularly serious crime” determination. The BIA singled
out a noncitizen’s mental health at the time of the offense as
a fact that the immigration judge cannot consider. The BIA’s
rationale for prohibiting immigration judges from taking
mental health into account was that doing so would “go
behind the decisions of the criminal judge and reassess any
ruling on criminal culpability.”10 The BIA reasoned that the
fact finders in criminal proceedings “have expertise in the
applicable State and Federal criminal law, are informed by
the evidence presented by the defendant and the prosecution,
and have the benefit of weighing all the factors firsthand.”11
In addition, the BIA observed that there are several ways
during criminal proceedings to raise the issue of a
defendant’s mental condition.
These include challenging
competency to stand trial; raising the affirmative defense of
not guilty by reason of insanity; showing the absence of the
mens rea required for a conviction; and arguing that mental
health should be a mitigating factor for sentencing.12 In
addition, the BIA noted that mental health issues may be
raised in post-conviction motions, appeals, and petitions.13
Since the respondent in Matter of G-G-S- had not presented
any evidence of “a plea of guilty by reason of insanity,” and no
findings regarding insanity were made during his criminal
proceedings, the BIA concluded that his mental illness should
not be considered as part of the “particularly serious crime”
analysis.14 This reasoning is deeply flawed for the reasons
discussed below.
II
9
10
11
12
13
14

In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007) (emphasis added).
Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 345 (BIA 2014).
Id.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. at 346.

28

CORNELL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol.101:25

THE FLAWED LOGIC OF MATTER OF G-G-SIn prohibiting immigration judges from considering a
noncitizen’s mental health status at the time of an offense,
the BIA assumes that any issues related to mental health
have already been handled by the criminal court, so there is
no need for the immigration judge to stir this pot again. The
reality, however, is that defendants often do not raise the
issue of mental health in criminal proceedings because of the
risks involved in doing so, or they are constrained in how and
when they can raise the issue by various state laws.
A. Competence Not Relevant to Mental State at Time of
Offense
As an initial matter, insofar as the BIA mentions
competence determinations as an opportunity to introduce
evidence about a defendant’s mental state at the time of an
offense, it fails to recognize that such determinations focus
on a defendant’s mental state during the criminal proceeding,
not at the time of the offense. A defendant may become
incompetent after committing an offense, or, conversely, a
defendant who was incompetent at the time of the offense
may be restored to competence before the criminal
proceedings begin. The mere fact that competence was not
raised during the criminal proceedings therefore provides no
information about the defendant’s mental condition at the
time of the offense, and the BIA has made it quite clear that
the “particularly serious crime” determination is not
concerned with events that occur after the crime.15
In addition, even where the competence inquiry somehow
sheds light on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the
offense, defense attorneys often do not raise concerns about
incompetence for strategic reasons.
Empirical evidence
shows that defense attorneys harbor doubts about the mental
capacity of their clients in about 8% to 15% of felony cases,
but mental health assessments are sought in less than half of
these.16
Defense attorneys are wary of findings of
incompetence because they can result in lengthy civil

15 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (BIA 2007) (finding that the
particularly serious crime determination does not focus on facts that occurred
after the crime was committed).
16 Steven K. Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases:
Client Competence and Participation as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 385, 389 (1992); Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist
Counsel and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases; Findings from Three Studies, 18
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 437, 441–43, 446 (1994).
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commitment.17 If a defendant is found incompetent, efforts
are made to restore that person to competence, which can
include the involuntary administration of medications.18
Defendants who cannot be restored to competence and are
considered a danger to self or others are subjected to civil
commitment, which, in many states, can last for an indefinite
period of time.19
B. The Insanity Defense
Unlike mental competence, which is a prerequisite for a
defendant to stand trial, insanity is an affirmative defense
that may be raised during the trial. By making an insanity
defense, the defendant admits to committing the offense but
argues lack of culpability due to his or her mental state at the
time. While the test used to determine “insanity” varies from
state to state, there are two dominant approaches.20 Under
the M’Naughten rule, the trier of fact must determine whether
the defendant could understand the difference between right
and wrong and, if not, whether this was due to a mental
disease or defect.
A less restrictive approach requires
showing that the defendant lacked sufficient capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his acts, or to conform his actions
to the requirements of law, due to mental disease or defect.
Within each of these general approaches, variations exist
among states. The burden of proof also varies, with some
states placing the burden on the government to show that the
defendant was sane at the time of the offense and others
requiring the defendant to show insanity at the time of the
offense.21
1. Risks Involved in Making an Insanity Defense
While Matter of G-G-S- suggests that a defendant who was
mentally ill at the time of the offense would be expected to
make an insanity defense, thereby allowing the trier of fact to
take mental health into consideration in determining
culpability, empirical data clearly indicate otherwise. Studies
17

See Robert D. Miller, Criminal Responsibility, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
1994)
Lacks Care: Competency to Make
Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 561, 571–72 (2012).
19 See Miller, supra note 17, at 200.
20 See Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the
Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 23
Law & Hum. Behav. 375, 377 (1999).
21 See id. at 381–82.
OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 200 (R. Rosner, ed.,
18 See Dora W. Klein, When Coercion
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show that the insanity defense is raised in only 1% of felony
cases, and, when raised, it is rarely successful.22 Some
studies have found that the insanity defense succeeds in one
out of four cases, while others have found a success rate as
low as one in a thousand.23 The overall low success rate may
itself be a deterrent to making the defense, but there are
other reasons to avoid it as well. Defendants whose insanity
defenses are unsuccessful—which represents the vast
majority of those who raise it—receive significantly longer
sentences than those who are convicted without having
argued insanity.24 In other words, defendants pay a penalty
for arguing insanity and losing.
Furthermore, in many states, defendants acquitted based
on insanity often experience longer periods of civil
commitment than the maximum length of time in prison that
a defendant could have served for the crime. This creates an
incentive for defendants to plead guilty even if they have a
strong insanity defense. For example, studies have found
that in California, New York, Connecticut, Colorado, and the
District of Columbia, defendants acquitted through an
insanity defense are confined for longer periods of time than
convicted individuals.25 Some studies show that individuals
who succeed with an insanity defense spend nearly twice as
long in civil commitment as defendants convicted of similar
crimes spend in prison; additionally, they often face post22 Id. at 378; Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of
Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULLETIN AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 331, 334–35 (1991).
23 See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM, 58–61 (1993); Borum & Fulero, 20 note 20, at 378;
see also Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental
Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL. 7,
11–12 (2007) (citing a success rate of under 25%); Heather Leigh Stangle,
Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence, and the Myth of Postpartum Mental
Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
699, 728 (2008) (citing a success rate of 1 in 1000 criminal trials); Stephen G.
Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law
Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1723 (2005) (citing success rates ranging from 0.87% to
26%).
24 Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The
Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULLETIN AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 5, 12 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Myths]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 599, 650 (1990); Joseph Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense
Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397,
401–02 (1983).
25 Miller, supra note 17, at 198–215; Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment?
Comparing the Lengths of Confinement of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity
Defendants, 19 L. &. HUM. BEHAV. 375, 384–87 (1995).
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release judicial oversight for the rest of their lives.26 One
study found that in California, individuals acquitted based on
insanity for nonviolent crimes were confined for nine times as
long as those convicted.27
The chance of being promptly released is also much
higher in some states for those who are convicted than for
those who are acquitted based on insanity. For example, in
Georgia, less than 1% of defendants found not guilty by
reason of insanity were released upon acquittal, compared to
30% of those found guilty; in California, 5.5% of defendants
acquitted based on insanity were released, compared to 29%
of those convicted; and in Ohio, 7% of defendants acquitted
based on insanity were released, compared to 32% of those
convicted.28 Consequently, critics of the insanity defense
contend that “post-acquittal hospitalization is used to punish
insanity acquittees.”29
Defense attorneys must take all of this into consideration
in advising their clients about whether or not to make an
insanity defense. In many states, civil commitment can be
indefinite, and that possibility may be more frightening to
defendants than a finite period of incarceration. The National
Alliance on Mental Illness has acknowledged that deciding
whether or not to use the insanity defense is a complex,
strategic decision that often turns on nuanced and localized
factors, such as “the attitude of the court and the community
to mental illness . . . .”30 The risks involved in making an
insanity defense in criminal proceedings, however, do not
exist in immigration proceedings, where neither the
immigration judge nor the Department of Homeland Security
has the authority to initiate civil commitment or order
incarceration.31

26 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 58–61; Perlin, Myths, supra note 24,
at 12; Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8
INT’L J. L. PSYCHIATRY 237, 240 (1986); Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 401–02.
27 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 58–61; Pogrebin et al., supra note 26,
at 240; Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 401–02.
28 Silver, supra note 25, at Table 4.
29 Donald M. Linhorst & P. Ann Dirks-Linhorst, A Critical Assessment of
Disposition Options for Mentally Ill Offenders, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 65, 73 (1999).
30 NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, DEP’T OF POL’Y AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, A
GUIDE TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 25–26,
http://www.pacenterofexcellence.pitt.edu/documents/Guide_to_Mental_Illnes
s_and_the_Criminal_Justice_System_NAMI.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Q5Q-CXLM].
31 See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case For
a Right to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929
(2014).
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2. Defendants with Mental Illness May Resist Arguing
Insanity
Another problem is that some mentally ill defendants
refuse to invoke the insanity defense. While attorneys can
raise the issue of incompetence even if the client insists she
is competent, an attorney is supposed to adhere to the
client’s decision about whether or not to use an insanity
defense.32 One study found that among 139 cases where
there was clinical support for an insanity defense, 10% of the
defendants resisted making the defense and another 15%
were not receptive to attributing the offense to mental
illness.33
Thus, one-quarter of the defendants resisted
arguing insanity even when it was a pivotal issue in the case.
Such resistance may reflect some defendants’ lack of
insight into their own mental health conditions, or it may
result from a desire to avoid “the prospect of psychiatric
labeling,
stigmatization,
and
indeterminate
hospitalization . . . .”34 If the latter, those fears may not carry
as much weight in a situation where deportation and possible
persecution are on the table, rather than just imprisonment.
In other words, the balance an individual strikes between the
potential risks and benefits of acknowledging the role of a
mental illness in the commission of a crime may well be
different in a criminal case and an immigration case. Binding
a noncitizen facing removal to a decision about mental illness
made in a criminal case ignores the different stakes involved
in these two types of proceedings.
3. Several States Do Not Recognize an Insanity Defense
Finally, several states simply do not recognize an insanity
defense. Specifically, Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas do
not recognize the insanity defense.35 Since the U.S. Supreme
Court has never addressed whether an insanity defense is
constitutionally required, several state courts have upheld its
abolishment.36 Nevada’s legislature abolished the insanity
32 See STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF.
FUNCTION § 4-5.2 & cmt. at 199-202 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
33 Richard J. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An
Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48, 54–55 (1996).
34 Id. at 58.
35 See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995);
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999).
36 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 791–802 (1952) (declining to specify
a particular insanity test required by due process); see also Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“States are free to
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defense in 1995, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that it
was constitutionally required in 2001.37 The U.S. Supreme
Court declined certiorari in this case, despite the conflict with
the rulings of other state courts. The absence of Supreme
Court authority on this issue makes it possible for additional
states to abolish the insanity defense in the future.
Prohibiting immigration judges from considering mental
health status at the time of an offense under the theory that
its role in culpability has already been addressed by the
criminal court ignores the fact that not all defendants are
allowed to argue not guilty by reason of insanity. Under G-GS-, these individuals are subjected to the double penalty of
not being able to argue insanity in either criminal or
immigration proceedings.
C. Limitations of Mens Rea Defenses Based on Mental
Illness
Even if a defendant does not or cannot make an insanity
defense, she may be able to introduce evidence of mental
illness to try to prove the absence of the requisite mens rea.38
Mens rea defenses are not, however, available to all
defendants. First, many crimes are strict liability offenses.
Since no specific mental state is required as an element of
these offenses, evidence of mental illness may never be
introduced during the criminal proceedings.
Similarly,
mental illness is not a defense to crimes that require only
negligence.39
Second, when people with mental illness commit crimes
that do require intent, lack of mens rea “is extremely rare.”40
Daniel M’Naghten, for example, had delusions of a Tory plot
to kill him and therefore formed a preemptive plan to kill the
Prime Minister.41
When he mistakenly killed the Prime
Minister’s Secretary, he intended to kill a person, and
recognize and define the insanity defense as they see fit.”).
37 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (1997); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 86
(Nev. 2001) (holding that the abolition of the insanity defense violated due
process), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
38 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“Evidence that the
defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is
relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is
an element of the offense.”); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting
the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, n. 2 (2000).
39 Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between
Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1090 (2007); Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1239.
40 Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1205.
41 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1089.
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therefore would not be able to negate the mens rea for the
crime.42 Likewise, when Andrea Yates drowned her five
children because she believed Satan would otherwise torment
them, she had the intent to kill, despite the delusional
circumstances surrounding the murder.43 As Christopher
Slobogin has observed, “most people with mental disorder
who cause harm mean to do so, albeit sometimes for reasons
that seem irrational.”44
Similarly, Morse and Hoffman
conclude that only on “rare occasions” is mental illness
inconsistent with the formation of mens rea.45
Third, states may prohibit evidence of mental illness from
being used to show that the defendant did not possess the
requisite mens rea. In Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of an Arizona rule that
prohibited the admission of expert psychiatric evidence and
other evidence of mental disorder, short of legal insanity, to
negate mens rea.46
The Court found it permissible for
Arizona to exclude “mental disease evidence” and “capacity
evidence,” although it found that “observation evidence” must
be admitted.47 Under Clark, states may exclude testimony,
usually provided by experts, about the defendant’s mental
disorder and capacity for cognition and moral judgment,
which bear directly on the ability to form the requisite mens
rea.
But even where evidence of a mental disorder is
admitted into evidence to help show the defendant’s capacity
to form a mental state, such evidence “will almost never help
resolve whether that state was formed in fact.”48
D. Drawbacks of “Guilty But Mentally Ill” Verdict
The BIA’s decision in G-G-S- mentions that the
respondent had not presented any evidence of “a plea of
guilty by reason of insanity.”49
This phrase appears to
conflate the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of
42

Id.
Id. at 1089–90.
44 Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1205 (describing four situations where mens
rea is absent—involuntary action, mistake as to results, mistake as to
circumstances, and ignorance of the law—and arguing that mental illness is
most likely to play a role in the third scenario).
45 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1090.
46 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (examining, inter alia, the constitutionality of the
Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz.
1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997)).
47 Scholars have criticized the lack of clarity in this tripartite formulation.
See, e.g., Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1104–11.
48 Id. at 1089.
49 Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 346 (BIA 2014).
43
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insanity with the verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI).
In many states, GBMI requires proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant committed the act and was aware
of its wrongfulness but had a mental disorder that
substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to
the law.50 Defendants who plead GBMI are still guilty and
therefore criminally culpable.
They are subject to
incarceration and may even receive the death penalty. A
GBMI verdict does not even provide additional treatment
opportunities. The GBMI verdict differs from a regular guilty
verdict only by recognizing that the defendant had a mental
disorder at the time of the offense.
Some defendants
mistakenly perceive GBMI as reducing culpability. In reality,
GBMI requires the defendant to admit to an additional
stigmatizing fact while receiving nothing in return.51
Consequently, GBMI has been described as “a politically
expedient ‘third-way’ fraud.”52
Pleas are the most common way that GBMI verdicts
occur.53 Commentators have recognized that “these pleas
appear to reflect civil commitment concerns for the best
interests of the client.”54 In other words, as discussed above,
defendants may decline to use an insanity defense and
instead plead GBMI in order to avoid a lengthy or indefinite
civil commitment. But there is also an advantage to pleading
guilty instead of GBMI, since GBMI verdicts tend to result in
longer sentences than mentally ill defendants receive with
typical guilty pleas.55 In the aftermath of G-G-S-, noncitizen
defendants may now have to choose whether to plead to
GBMI in order to make it clear for the removal proceedings
that mental illness played a role in the offense or to simply
plead guilty to get a shorter sentence.

50

Borum & Fulero, supra note 20, at 382–83.
Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty but Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26
B.C. L. REV. 601, 605 (1985); Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty but Mentally Ill
Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 361–77 (1996).
52 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1122.
53 John Klofas & Ralph Weisheit, Pleading Guilty but Mentally Ill: Adversarial
Justice and Mental Health, 9 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 491, 493–94 (1986).
54 Id. at 491.
55 INSTITUTE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE LAW, THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY
ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 1–78 (1985); see also Lisa A. Callahan et al.,
Measuring the Effects of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict: Georgia’s 1982
GBMI Reform, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 449 (1992).
51
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E. Constraints and Discretion in Sentencing
The BIA indicates in Matter of G-G-S- that sentencing is
another phase of the criminal proceeding where mental
health issues are taken into consideration.56 The defendant’s
probation officer typically includes a mental health history in
the presentencing report. Yet judges may be constrained in
their ability to consider mental illness by sentencing
guidelines, or, on the other end of the spectrum, they may
decline to exercise the discretion they are given to consider
mental illness during sentencing.
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mental and
emotional conditions may be considered in sentencing if
“present to an unusual degree.”57 A downward departure
may be justified if “(1) the defendant committed the offense
while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity;
and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed
substantially to the commission of the offense.”58
The
Guidelines further explain that the extent of the departure
“should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.”59
Downward departure is prohibited, however, if voluntary use
of drugs or intoxicants caused the reduced mental capacity, if
the facts indicate a need to protect the public, or if the
defendant was convicted of certain enumerated offenses.60
Some state sentencing guidelines track the U.S.
Guidelines’ language about downward departures for
diminished mental capacity.61
Others give judges broad
discretion to consider any mitigating factors without
specifically mentioning mental condition.62 Johnston notes
that “a state’s failure to enumerate vulnerability due to a
mental condition as a mitigating factor might suggest an
inability to depart on this basis.”63 But even in situations

56

Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 345 (BIA 2014).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015). Federal courts have also at times relied on Guidelines §§ 5K2.0, 5H1.4,
and 5K2.13 provisions for downward departure based on suspected or
demonstrated hardship in prison. See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just
Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
147, 153 n.21 (2013).
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where judges recognize that sentencing is discretionary,
“there is no guarantee that the appropriate role of mental
abnormality will be considered or that individual sentencing
judges will calibrate punishment properly even if they do take
mental abnormality into account.”64
Perhaps most importantly, the empirical evidence
discussed above indicates that in cases where defendants are
convicted after having raised mental health issues, the
sentences actually turn out to be longer than if they had not
raised the issue at all.65 This evidence undercuts the notion
in G-G-S- that sentences take into consideration the role of
mental illness so there is no need for immigration judges to
consider the issue. Furthermore, in prior decisions, the BIA
has indicated that the sentence imposed is the least
important factor in the “particularly serious crime”
determination, because it is “not the most accurate or salient
factor to consider in determining the seriousness of an
offense.”66 If the length of the sentence is not that important,
then it makes little sense to suggest that mental illness need
not be considered because any role it played is already
reflected in the sentence.
CONCLUSION
In foreclosing the opportunity for immigration judges to
consider evidence of mental illness in determining whether an
offense constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” the BIA
assumes that the conviction and sentence already
incorporate the role that mental illness played in the offense.
But that assumption is flawed. Strong incentives exist for
defendants not to raise the issue of mental illness in criminal
proceedings, such as avoiding indefinite civil commitment if
acquitted or a longer sentence if convicted. Furthermore, not
all states allow defendants to make an insanity defense or to
use evidence of mental illness to negate mens rea. Finally,
when it comes to sentencing, judges may be constrained by
sentencing guidelines or may simply decide, in the exercise of
discretion, not to use mental illness as a mitigating factor.
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66 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (BIA 2007). In this case, the BIA
found that “the sentence imposed is not a dominant factor in determining
whether a conviction is for a particularly serious crime.” Id. The BIA also
minimized the importance of factors that occur subsequent to the offense, such
as cooperation with law enforcement, explaining that they “bear only on
sentencing.” Id.
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The sentence therefore does not necessarily take into account
the role of mental illness in the offense. Given these facts,
immigration judges should be allowed to consider the role of
mental illness in determining whether an offense constitutes
a “particularly serious crime.”
Depriving immigration judges of this power places
individuals with mental illness in danger of being deported to
countries where they face a serious risk of persecution. Even
someone who demonstrates a greater than fifty percent
chance of persecution may be deported based on a
“particularly serious crime.” Matter of G-G-S- also places
unreasonable demands on criminal defense attorneys, who
must advise defendants about the immigration consequences
of a plea in order to provide effective assistance of counsel.67
Such consequences include preserving relief from removal,
which means avoiding bars like a conviction for a
“particularly serious crime.” By limiting immigration judges
to the findings of the criminal court regarding the role that
mental illness played in a crime, Matter of G-G-S- places
defense attorneys in the extremely difficult, if not impossible,
position of having to navigate the conflicting consequences of
raising mental health issues in two totally different
proceedings. In some cases, this means choosing between an
indefinite amount of time in an institution and persecution.
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